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The Black vote was not a decisive factor both parties, although much more so ir;
in the outcome of the 1980 presidential the Democratic than in the Republicar.
elections. Black support for Ronald Rea- Party.
gan was not crucial to his victory and in
Election day surveys conducted by the
view of his large victory margin, no level Joint Center for Political Studies revea.
or configuration of Black voting could that the turnout rate for Black voters in
have denied him the presidency. Never- the 1980 presidential election was very
theless, Black political activity in 1980 close to that of 1976j that Blacks again
was better organized and more purpose- gave overwhelming support to President
ful than it had ever been in connection Carter, and that they exhibited much
with a presidential election.
less uneasiness with this support than
The year's activities began with a the news media and even some Black
national conference in Richmond, Va., leaders had anticipated.
in February ['80] to draft a Black political
Data on registration and voting gathagenda, and culminated in a December ered by the Joint Center from about 800
11th Blair House meeting between the randomly selected precincts with 90
Black Leadership Forum and President- percent or more of the population Black,
elect Reagan. Black political participa- showed that 61.3 percent of the registion, as well as overall national political tered voters went to the polls. Turnout
events in 1980, might very well portend by registered Black voters was highest in
important new directions for Blacks in the Northeast (67 percent) and lowest in
their efforts to be genuinely influential
the South (60percent).
participants in the political arena.
The turnout rate for Blacks in 1980 is
The Conference (National Conference especially encouraging when the style
on a Black Agenda for the 1980s) had and content of the presidential election
three major accomplishments. First, it are considered. There was relatively
focused the attention of the Black popu- little in either the style or issue content
lation and particularly of Black leaders of the election to generate strong interon several major issues of special con- est in voting among Blacks. Perhaps recern. Second, in spite of inevitable dif- flecting the changed character of race in
ferences among participants on several American politics, few explicitly racial
issues were raised during the campaign.
specific questions, the conference
The Joint Center's study of Black votachieved an unprecedented degree of
consensus on the broad issues with ing in the 1980 presidential election
which Blacks should be concerned in the shows that as in 1976, President Carter
decade of the 1980s. Third, it produced a won the overwhelming majority of the
single document embracing these con- Black vote. Data from the sample of
cerns which could help to guide Black Black precincts indicate that about 90
political participation in 1980 as well as percent of the vote went to President
in the decade ahead.
Carter, 7 percent to Governor Reagan
The candidate selection or nominating and about 2 percent to Congressman
process is a vital stage in the selection John Anderson.
of a President not only because one canIn spite of some misgivings, Blacks
didate is chosen from among the several chose overwhelmingly to continue their
aspirants within each party, but also be- support for President Carter and the
cause the tone and direction of each Democratic Party in the 1980 presidenparty's position on major issues is tial elections. In doing so, they stood vir- shaped at this stage. Blacks have become tually alone. Postmortems of the elecincreasingly active in the candidate tion indicate that every other segment of
selection process and in 1980 they were the electorate that had been strongly
important participants in this process in identified with the Democratic Party in
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the past, shifted toward the Republican
Party. This was true of Mexican-American, Jewish and labor groups. The outcome of the election is understandably
disappointing to Blacks and it poses several profound and perplexing questions
about Black political participation in the
years ahead.
One potential benefit of the outcome
of the election is that it may have freed
Black voters to think more independently, creatively, and pragmatically about
the pattern of their political participation in the future. The Republican Party,
led by Reagan, is in a good position to
reach out to Blacks, to demonstrate the
party's capacity to respond to their interests, and to incorporate them to a
significant degree into the structure of
the party.
The election results also provide an
unprecedented opportunity for Blacks
to play a leading part in restructuring
the Democratic Party as it seeks to recover from the serious defeat of
November.
Another potential benefit of the outcome of the 1980 election is that it challenges Blacks to a new and perhaps more
sophisticated style of politics. Undoubtedly, a Reagan Administration will seek
different approaches to some of the
chronic national problems that Blacks
have sought to address for the past several decades. Blacks will need to formulate some of their specific objectives and
modify some of the strategies they have
advocated in seeking to protect their
interests.
Still another likely benefit for Blacks
might derive from the need to reemphame self-help. The tendency to focus on
the government for solutions to many of
the pressing problems Blacks face, sometimes overshadows the clear and urgent
need for a more vigorous effort by Blacks
to achieve social and economic advancement for themselves in spite of continuing obstacles to their advancement.
There are many areas in which govemrnent can only be a partner-and for
http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol8/iss3/4

Blacks
a reluctan t partner - in
development.
To emphasize the likely benefits of a
Reagan presidency is not to ignore or
underestimate the actual and potential
problems it poses for Blacks and other
disadvantaged minorities. Many commentators have hastened to interpret
the outcome of the election as representing a fundamental ideological shift by
the electorate, one conferring a mandate
for sweeping retrenchment and retreat
from much of the social progress of recent years. However, the available data
on the attitudes and perceptions of the
electorate provide no conclusive evidence for such an interpretation. On the
contrary, those data suggest that the
electorate sought mainly a change in
leadership and improvement in the
country's economy, military strength,
and international standing. An assumption by the Administration that it is
mandated to implement sweeping conservative reforms could indeed be devastating for Blacks, other minorities, and
all the poor and disadvantaged in the'
society.
The history of racial discrimination in
this society and efforts to combat it indicate that the federal government has
been vital to the survival of Blacks. Furthermore, while they are not the only,
or even the principal beneficiaries of the
major social programs of the past two
decades geared to assist the low-income
and the otherwise disadvantaged, a
large proportion of the Black population
is especially dependent on them and
thus highly vulnerable to any major cutbacks. Anything but the most cautions
moves toward reforming social programs, or further sharing resources and
power with state and local governments,
could be extremely detrimental to
Blacks and require them to struggle
relentlessly for their survival. If eternal
vigilance is the price of liberty for all
Americans, it is considerably more so
for Black Americans as they approach
the new Administration.
0
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The Status of
Black
Leadership
By Charles V. Hamilton
Historically and currently, Black leadership in this country has had to submit to
at least one crucial test of legitimacy. It
has had to withstand almost constant
attacks from those who would question
both its judgments and its motives.
And in the process, it has been strengthened and made viable. Historically, for
the most part, it has not been an elected
leadership, in the sense of a represented
constituency choosing it at the pollsthat has only occurred substantially in
the last decade or so- but its claim to
speak for a designated group has not
been taken for granted, inasmuch as it
has not always (some might suggest,
ever) been simply taken at its word.
If vast numbers of people continue to
pay dues and otherwise support the organization, it is reasonable to conclude
that the leadership and its programs and
processes are consented to in large measure. This might not be entirely satisfactory to one who requires a more direct
periodic electoral mechanism for sanctioning leaders. But neither does it justify the conclusion that "there is no
institutional mechanism" to assess a
claim of leadership.
Without question, there is a clear ideological preference on the part of most
(certainly not all) Black leaders for what
can be characterized as a "liberal" approach to public policy. Even where this
liberalism is not associated with the
Democratic Party or with a political
party more liberal (or socialist) in orientation, it usually comes down on the
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